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Abstract: My dissertation comprises two chapters. The first chapter is an empirical
study of government spending effects in both developed and developing countries.
Based on the panel structural VAR analysis and the sign-restriction method for iden-
tifying the government spending shock, I find that private consumption increases
in response to a positive government spending shock in both groups, yet such con-
sumption effect is greater in developing than industrial countries; the response of real
effective exchange rate to the government spending shock varies across groups: it
depreciates in developed countries and appreciates in developing countries.
The second chapter investigates the transmission mechanism underlying the empir-
ical findings of the first chapter. I set up a New Keynesian small open economy model,
augmented with hand-to-mouth consumers, non-separable preferences between public
and private consumptions, and government spending reversals to well replicate the
responses of private consumption and the real exchange rate in the first chapter. The
large fraction of hand-to-mouth consumers and high complementarity between public
and private consumption contribute to the greater positive response of private con-
sumption in developing countries; when introducing spending reversals to the model
in the context of developed countries, it magnifies the positive response of private
consumption by mitigating the negative wealth effect resulting from a fiscal expan-
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CHAPTER I
THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON CONSUMPTION
AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in the role of fiscal policy in
stabilizing the economy due to the less effectiveness of monetary policy after 2008
financial crisis, as nominal interest rate has reached zero bound in major developed
countries. Regarding the consequences of fiscal policy in open economies, a body
of studies based on structural vector autoregression (VAR) have generated a lively
debate. As discussed in Ilzetzki et al. (2013), the key issue in the debate is that there
is no consensus on the approach to identify the fiscal shock, even in the context of
a structural VAR analysis. The short-run restriction method, firstly introduced in
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) by assuming that changes in government consumption
require at least one quarter to respond to innovations in other macroeconomic vari-
ables so as to identify the structure shock, is largely employed in the following relevant
VAR literature. For example, Ravn et al. (2012) apply a panel structural VAR to four
industrialized countries and document the empirical evidence of an increased private
consumption and a real depreciation after the positive government spending shock.
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Consistent results are shown in Corsetti et al. (2012)’s paper, who use the same Blanchard-
Perotti identification scheme as Ravn et al. (2012) to U.S. data. Another approach called
sign-restriction is developed in Uhlig (2005). In this identification method, sign restric-
tions are imposed on the impulse response functions of certain variables. Sign-restriction
method gains more attention in identifying the monetary policy, yet recently researchers
have extended the sign-restriction scheme to identify the fiscal shocks and provided com-
plementary VAR evidence to the ongoing debate. A negative response of consumption
accompanied by a depreciation of real exchange rate to a fiscal shock is found in En-
ders et al. (2011), which is based on an alternative sign-restrictions identification method
and analysis of U.S. time series data. Following the signs of several impulse responses
formally derived by Enders et al. (2011), Iwata (2013) uses the sign-restrictions scheme
to identify the government spending shock in context of Japan data and shows that
private consumption goes up and real exchange rate depreciates in response to a fiscal
expansion.1
Theoretical studies have suggested that dynamics of real exchange rate and private
consumption are related in an open economy setting under the assumption of complete
assets market. After a positive government spending shock, a positive (negative) con-
sumption is associated with a real depreciation (appreciation) via the international risk
sharing condition. On the other hand, differences across countries play a crucial role in
evaluating the impacts of fiscal policy, which is shown in relevant literature such as Kim
(2015) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013). However, previous studies have mostly investigated
into consumption and(or) real exchange rate in the context of advanced countries data,
paying less attention to the development variation across countries in the models. To
shed light on this issue, this paper conducts an empirical investigation into the impact
of government spending shocks on consumption, trade balance and real exchange rate in
both developed and developing countries. Specifically, I apply a panel structural VAR
model to a group of 10 developed countries and a group of 14 developing countries with
1According to the definition of the real effective exchange rate (REER) discussed in Section 3, an increase indicates a
depreciation of the economy’s currency against its trade partner.
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quarterly time-series data and identify government spending shocks by imposing robust
restrictions on the signs of several impulse responses of the model, following Uhlig (2005)
and Mountford and Uhlig (2009). This paper attempts to answer the following two ques-
tions: First, what are the empirical impacts of fiscal policy on private consumption and
on real exchange rate in both developing and developed countries? Second, does there
exist cross-country differences on the impacts of government spending shocks on private
consumption and real exchange rate? If yes, what are the differences?
The main results of the empirical analysis can be summarized as follows: in both
groups private consumption shows a positive response to the government spending shock
and the consumption impact is smaller yet more persistent in developed countries; a
fiscal expansion tends to induce a real exchange rate appreciation in developing countries
and a real depreciation in developed countries; the trade balance goes into surplus after
an exogenous increase in government spending in all countries. These results deliver
several important implications. Although a crowding-in of consumption is triggered by
government spending shocks in all countries, consistent with several VAR analysis, the
response of consumption in developing countries displays a different pattern where the
effect is lager on impact and far more transient (dying out after about eight quarters).
The effect of government spending shocks on real exchange rate varies across countries.
A real depreciation in developed countries is consistent with the findings of recent related
VAR literature. However, a real appreciation in developing countries provides support for
the theoretical prediction of either traditional Mundell-Fleming IS-LM models, standard
international real business cycle models or the basic new open economy macroeconomics
models, in stark contrast with relevant studies mentioned above. Further, in developed
countries, the increased private consumption and the real exchange rate depreciation
reveal a positive correlation between the two variables, which implies that the assumption
of complete asset markets works well as the basis of dynamics of real exchange rate and
private consumption in developed countries. With complete asset markets, the ratio of
the marginal utilities of consumption across countries is tied to the real exchange rate,
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which implies that a rise in consumption is associated with an equilibrium depreciation
of real exchange rate. Yet, this assumption does not hold in developing countries where a
positive private consumption is accompanied by a real appreciation. All in all the degree
of development matters in assessing the effects of fiscal policy and the failure or success
of theoretical models.
This paper attempts to contribute to the following issues: first, the empirical literature
studying the link between fiscal policy and the private consumption and(or) the real
exchange rate has paid less attention on developing countries. It is, however, worth
exploring the effects of fiscal expansion in the context of developing countries. Although
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find that after a government spending shock, the real exchange
rate depreciates in the long run in developed countries while appreciates on impact in
developing countries, indicating the response of the real exchange rate tends to be affected
by the degree of development across countries. Private consumption is not included in
VAR model of Ilzetzki et al. (2013)’s paper. As mentioned before, the dynamics of private
consumption is tied closely to the dynamics of the real exchange rate, given international
risk-sharing under complete asset market consumption. Therefore, this paper provides a
complement to relevant studies with respect to the response of private consumption, the
response of the real exchange rate, and the consumption-real exchange rate relationship
in developing country fiscal policy. Second, this paper employs sign-restrictions scheme
to identify the government spending innovations other than the standard approaches
such as recursive Cholesky decomposition, short-run or long-run zero restrictions. Sign-
restrictions scheme is more agnostic than the standard approaches because it imposes
no restrictions on the impulse responses of variables of interest and just let the data
decide. Another advantage of sign-restrictions is its close link to theoretical models.
Since it identifies the structural inference in VAR models on basis of prior beliefs about
the signs of the impact of certain shocks, which can be derived from a large number
of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. It is hard for these models
to produce any zero restrictions or recursive structures. The value-added of this paper
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can be evaluated in the context of two closely related studies, namely Enders et al.
(2011) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013). Although Enders et al. (2011) formally derive the
sign and time horizon of the identification based on a quantitative general equilibrium
model, they then estimate VAR model on an individual country data2. In contrast,
this paper employs panel VAR on data of 24 countries to reveal evidence of the private
consumption and the real exchange rate impact to fiscal shocks in the open markets.
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) estimate the effects of government spending on both developed and
developing countries, that paper, nevertheless, focuses on fiscal multipliers and estimates
VAR model using standard approaches, that is, short-rum restrictions and a recursive
Cholesky decomposition to identify government spending shock3. This paper focuses on
the responses of private consumption and real exchange rate to a government spending
shock, employing alternative identification scheme, sign restrictions to identify the shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes identification
strategy. Section 3 estimates VAR model and compares the empirical results. Section 4
shows results for sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2. Panel VAR and Identification
2.1. Panel VAR
A reduced form panel VAR with country fixed effect is conducted and estimated to
illustrate the macroeconomic effects of a government spending shock
Yst = D
s + B(L)Yst−1 + ε
s
t (1)
where s = 1, 2 denotes two groups of countries with 1 as developing-country group and
2 as developed-country group; Ds is a vector of country dummies; Yst is a vector of
endogenous variables; The factor B(L) is a finite-order vector polynomial with the lag
operator L; and εst is a vector of mean-zero, serially uncorrelated shocks with diagonal
2They use U.S. time series relative to an aggregate of industrialized countries.
3They also provide some evidence of a real exchange rate depreciation (appreciation) to a fiscal expansion in industri-
alized (developing) countries.
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variance-covariance matrix Σ. The matrices of coefficients B is of size 9 by 9, given nine
endogenous variables.
The vector of endogenous variables, Yt in model (1), consists of the following: real per
capita government spending (government consumption only) deflated by the GDP defla-
tor, real per capita Gross Domestic Product(GDP), real per capita private consumption,
real per capita private investment, primary government budget balance-to-GDP ratio,
net export-to GDP ratio, real effective exchange rate defined as the ratio of a trade-
weighted average of exchange-rate-adjusted foreign CPIs to the domestic CPI, inflation
rate calculated by GDP deflator, and the domestic nominal 90-day interest rate. Each
variable is measured in logarithm, except for government budget balance-to-GDP ratio,
net export-to GDP ratio, and interest rate. The choice of these variables is largely de-
termined by the chosen identification method. GDP, private consumption, real effective
exchange rate and net exports are included as the focus of interest. Government budget
balance is there to identify fiscal policy shocks while interest rate and inflation rate are
included to identify monetary policy shocks. To maintain comparability with the related
literature, four lags of endogenous variables are included in the VAR model.4
2.2. Identification
To solve the identification problem of reduced VAR model, additional restrictions are
required. In this paper, sign-restriction scheme is used. That is, imposing certain signs
on the impulse responses of chosen variables to a fiscal expansion so as to make sure the
signs are consistent with the predictions of theoretical models. Specifically, researchers
need to find a matrix A such that εt = Aυt, where υt denotes the vector of structural
shocks, following the common assumption in VAR literature that E[υtυ′t] = I l. To
identify structural shocks, first imposing sign restrictions on impulse responses of selected
variables for a certain period and then consider various matrices A and check, for each
4Ravn et al. (2012) argues that the choice of lags in SVAR is guided by a likelihood ratio test which rejects the hypothesis
of one or two lags in favor of a longer lag length. The choice of lags is also dictated by sample length, e.g. three lags
are used in Iwata (2013) due to a relative short sample period. In this paper, three-lag and four-lag specification yield
virtually identical impulse response functions and error bands.
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case, whether the sign restrictions are fulfilled and dismiss the matrix if this is not the
case.
As mentioned above, several approaches are used to identify fiscal shocks. For example,
narrative approach proposed by Ramey and Shapiro (1998), yet it is relatively hard to
motivate in the context of a panel of countries where similar narrative data are not
available. Short-run zero restrictions by assuming the sluggish reaction of some variables
to fiscal policy shocks or by using additional detailed information about the tax system,
zero constraints on impact responses albeit justify in some cases, they are inconsistent
with most theoretical models.(Canova and Pina, 2005). This paper prefers to the third
alternative identification scheme: sign restrictions developed by Uhlig (2005). One reason
is that it is more agnostic than other identification methods. Another reason is that the
aim of this paper is to find dynamic properties of the time-series data and assess empirical
responses to government spending shocks in developed and developing countries based
on panel VAR analysis, sign-restrictions method allows to rely on time series data as
well as a priori theorizing to achieve the fiscal shock without additional informations or
assumptions required in other identification approaches.
Some recent literature have applied sign-restrictions approach to identify fiscal shocks.5
Enders et al. (2011) formally derive the sign and time horizon of the identification based
on a quantitative general equilibrium business cycle model and provide evidence of a
real depreciation for U.S. data. Iwata (2013) follows the restrictions of sign in Enders
et al. (2011) and provides consistent evidence of a real depreciation for Japan data. In
this paper, I impose restrictions along the lines of Enders et al. (2011). Table 1 shows
the set of sign restrictions used. The response of private consumption and the real
exchange rate to a fiscal expansion are of interest, which thus remain unrestricted. The
sign of net exports is also unrestricted because its response would vary due to different
specifications of the model.6 The sign of private investment is restricted in Enders et al.
5See Mountford and Uhlig (2009); Pappa (2009); Enders et al. (2011); Iwata (2013).
6Müller (2008) argues that the response of net exports to government spending shocks is determined by the trade price
elasticity: A high (low) trade price elasticity tend to cause a negative (positive) response.
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(2011)’s paper, and left unrestricted in Iwata (2013). However, the positive response of
private investment shown in VAR model is not consistent with the response produced
by the theoretical model proposed in Iwata (2013). In this paper, I follow theoretical
prediction that investment falls because current and expected future rental costs and the
real interest rate rise in response to a fiscal expansion. Output, inflation and interest
rate are supposed to arise as they respond to a government spending shock, in line with
what a large class of DSGE models predict. That a decline in budget balance in response
to the increased government spending is the key identifying strategy to distinguish a
government spending shock from other shocks, such as business cycle shock, or monetary
policy shocks. And the sign restrictions are imposed for a year after the shock, following
Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
3. Time Series Evidence
3.1. Data
I estimate the panel structural VAR model (1) on quarterly time series data. Previ-
ous literature such as Perotti (2004) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013), argue that the quarterly
data on government spending are interpolated in some countries, especially in developing
counties. To avoid the bias in estimation, it is necessary to use non-interpolated data.
Here, I use data sources documented in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) to obtain non-interpolated
data on government spending. The sample includes developed and developing economies
that have at least 15 years of quarterly data. Specifically, I follow the World Bank’s 2017
classification of middle high-income and high-income countries to identify developing and
developed economies, respectively.7 The choice of countries in each group is guided by
the availability of sufficient and reliable quarterly data on public consumption and gov-
ernment budget balance. The sample periods are from 1999Q1 to 2015Q4 for developed
countries, and 2000Q1 to 2015Q4 for developing countries. A more detailed description
7Exceptions are Israel and South Korea, which are categorized as emerging markets in J.P. Morgan Index, but are
denoted as high-income countries in the World Bank’s 2017 classification. In this paper, they are grouped into developing
countries.
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can be found in Appendix .4.
A selected de-seasonalization method, X-13 algorithm, was used to remove the strong
seasonal patterns of the data. To ensure all variables in the VAR model are stationary, I
follow Ilzetzki et al. (2013) to detrend government expenditure and GDP data, as well as
inflation rate by regressing them on a quadratic trend.8 The policy interest rate, primary
government budget balance-to-GDP ratio, net export-to GDP ratio were included in
levels and real effective exchange rate was included in first differences.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the main nine variables of all countries in-
cluded in the analysis. For the (detrended) government spending, the greatest standard
deviation is UK (0.7) in developed countries and Argentina (0.13) in developing coun-
tries, respectively. An obvious difference between developed and developing countries is
the standard deviation of nominal interest rate. Compared to developed-country group
(1.87), developing-country group has much larger standard deviation (10.62).
Table 3 reports summary statistics for quarterly government spending: the ratio of
government spending to GDP, the autocorrelation of (detrended) government spending,
and the variance of (detrended) government spending relative to the variance of (de-
trended) GDP. These statistics are firstly calculated for each country and then for the
two groups respectively by averaging the countries’ statistics within each group. In devel-
oped countries, government spending accounts for 15.29% of GDP in US, yet 25.38% in
Denmark. In developing counties, the proportion varies from 7.46% in Mexico to 23.76%
in Israel. Hence, the developed-country group has larger government size (19.67%) than
the developing-country group does (14.81%). The persistence of government spending
also shows a different pattern over the two groups. Autocorrelation coefficient varies
from 0.8 to 0.97 in developed countries and from 0.12 to 0.94 in developing countries,
reflecting that government spending is more persistent (with average coefficient of 0.9)
in developed countries and more transitory (0.6) in developing countries. Besides, the
developing-country group displays a greater volatility than the developed-country does,
8A linear trend yielded similar results.
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although government spending is more volatile than GDP in both groups.
3.2. VAR Evidence
The median, as well as the 16% and 84%, of the posterior distribution of impulse responses
to the identified government spending shock are displayed in Figure 1 and Figure 2 for
developing and developed countries, respectively. Evidence of developing economy shows
that private consumption ascends on impact, yet only approximately 8 quarters after the
impact does it fall below trend. Increased consumption contributes to the output rise,
which displays a similar pattern and the response is in a statistical significant way. The
real exchange rate appreciates slightly after the shock. Besides, the positive response
of private consumption and the negative response of real exchange rate show that co-
movement between the two variables after a government innovation does not exist in
the emerging market. Government spending, displayed in the upper left panel, rises
persistently and significantly. The improvement of net exports on impact then gradually
fades away in the following years due to the appreciation of real exchange rate. Budget
balance deteriorates persistently during the limited periods. Private investment shows an
significant decline after the shock and lasts about 5 years to go back its preshock trend.
Inflation increases on impact, and interest rates go up immediately after the shock given
non-negative response restriction, as well.
Compared to that of developing countries, in rich countries it takes about 20 quarters
for increased consumption to decline to its preshock trend, although the positive effect
on consumption is smaller in quantitative term. The real exchange rate depreciates on
impact and its response is mildly hump shaped and peaks at about 2 quarters after the
shock. Moreover, private consumption and real exchange rate show a positive relationship
which is consistent with the complete assets market assumption. The trade balance
improves after the shock, which may appear surprising because a strand of studies has
documented a positive correlation between fiscal and trade deficits and consistent results
of a trade balance deterioration are also shown in Corsetti and Müller (2006), Monacelli
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and Perotti (2006), and Ravn et al. (2012). However, Kim and Roubini (2008) finds that
fiscal expansions cause a significant and large improvement in current account. Müller
(2008) theoretically proves that the response of net exports would be positive if there
is home bias in private consumption. Except for private consumption, real exchange
rate and trade balance, the responses of which are of interest, other variables present
some discrepancies between developing and developed countries’ evidence, as well. In
quantitative term, the negative impact of a fiscal expansion on private investment is
larger while the positive impact on interest rate is smaller in developed than in developing
countries.
The stimulative effects of a fiscal expansion are generally framed in terms of multi-
pliers. One measure is the impact multiplier and the other is the cumulative multiplier.
Here I follow the definitions of fiscal multipliers proposed in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) to
compute the corresponding fiscal multipliers for output and private consumption, re-
spectively, given the impulse responses depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Results are
shown in Figure 3. For developing countries, the impact multiplier for output is 1.07 and
the impact multiplier for consumption is 0.25. The positive response of private consump-
tion accounts for the larger output multiplier. Since in standard models, the negative
wealth effect on consumption would mitigate the rise in output induced by a fiscal expan-
sion. For developed countries, the impact multiplier for output is 1.32 and the impact
multiplier for consumption is slightly negative at -0.11. Cumulative multiplier captures
the cumulative effects of the fiscal shocks along the entire path up to a given period.
For developing countries, up to 20 quarters after the shock, the cumulative multiplier
for output drops to 0.85 and the cumulative multiplier for consumption declines below
0 at -0.11, which implies that private consumption contributes to some crowding out of
output by government spending. For developed countries, the cumulative multiplier for
output drops to 1.22 and the cumulative multiplier for consumption rises to 0.17.
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3.3. Transmission Mechanism
In this section I turn to discuss the possible channels through which positive government
spending shocks affect the dynamics of private consumption, the real exchange rate and
trade balance. In the baseline model, a positive private consumption in response to a
fiscal expansion provides supportive evidence to the textbook IS-LM model’s prediction
of a crowding-in consumption, yet contradicts with the basic real business cycle model’s
prediction of a crowding-out consumption. So far, a class of DSGE models has been built
up to reconcile the contradiction between empirical findings and theoretical predictions,
for example, non-Ricardian households, the complementary between public and private
consumption, “deep habits”, etc. See Galí et al. (2007), Bouakez and Rebei (2007), and
Ravn et al. (2012). Empirical evidence also shows that the positive consumption response
is larger in developing than in developed countries. One potential explanation is that, in
most developing countries, there are a large number of hand-to-mouth consumers, who
simply consume their current income, which in turn reflects an inability to trade in asset
markets due to infinite transactions costs. In this case, the fiscal expansion has a greater
stimulating effect on private consumption.
The response of the real exchange rate to a positive government spending shock ap-
preciates in developing countries, which is opposite to the real exchange rate response
in developed countries. One possible explanation of the obvious discrepancy between
the two groups of countries might be that households in developed countries have quite
different preferences, compared to those in developing countries.9 Another possible ex-
planation is that public consumption is mainly in the form of non-tradables, so a fiscal
expansion tends to push up the price of non-tradable goods. In developing countries,
fluctuations in the relative price of non-tradable goods to tradable goods contributes to
the real exchange rate movements, and thus an increase in the relative price of non-
tradables to tradables in turn appreciates real exchange rate. However, real exchange
9Ravn et al. (2012) documents a real exchange rate depreciation in response to government spending innovations and
introduces a model with non-standard preference to get this result.
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rate movements in developed countries reflect mainly the relative price of tradables, and
thus the relatively lower price of tradable goods tends to depreciate real exchange rate.10
Müller (2008) provides a theoretical explanation to the surprising finding of trade
balance improvement in both developing and developed countries after the fiscal shock.
He argues that the response of net exports to government spending shocks is determined
by trade price elasticity. That is, net exports is likely to rise if private consumption
in domestic country is relatively lower than that in foreign country and if there exists
limited substitution from home to foreign goods, given certain degree of home bias in
private consumption. In this case, resources transfer from domestic country to foreign
country.
4. Further Sensitivity Analysis
I check the robustness of the results in several ways. Firstly, I investigate whether re-
sults are sensitive to the alternative identification scheme: a conventional short-run zero
restrictions method, proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and then employed by
Ravn et al. (2012) in a panel VAR model. Five variables including government spend-
ing, output, private consumption, net exports and real effective exchange rate are used.
Government spending shocks are identified by the assumption that it requires at least
a one quarter lag for government spending to respond to structural innovations except
for government spending innovations. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the results. After a
positive government spending shock, private consumption increases in both developed
and developing countries, while the real exchange rate appreciates in emerging markets
and depreciates in rich countries. These results are well in line with those obtained by
the baseline model. One difference exists in the response of net exports, which is positive
in the baseline model but negative in short-run restrictions. Another is that the positive
effect of a fiscal expansion on private consumption is larger in developed than in de-
10Engel (1999) shows that almost all of the variance in the bilateral real exchange rates between U.S. and a number of
other high-income countries is attributable to fluctuations in the real exchange rates of traded goods, which is inconsistent
with the implications of traditional real exchange rate theory: all movements in the bilateral real exchange rate between
two countries are due to fluctuations in the bilateral relative price of non-traded to traded goods.
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veloping countries in short-run restrictions, which is contrary to that of baseline model.
Fiscal multipliers for developed and developing countries are calculated as well, based on
the impulse responses obtained in short-run restrictions. Results are shown in Figure 6.
The impact multiplier for output is larger in developed (>0.5) than in developing (<0.5)
countries. The cumulative multiplier for output declines to -0.5 in developed countries
and rises to 0.6 in developing countries in the long run(20 quarters after the shock). The
impact multiplier for consumption is also larger in developed (>0.4) than in developing
(<0.4) countries. The cumulative multiplier for consumption declines to 0.25 in devel-
oped countries and rises to about 0.4 in developing countries in the long run. Compared
to results of the baseline model, fiscal multipliers differ not only in pattern but also in
quantitative terms. One possible reason is the different response of net exports in the two
models. In the model with short-run restrictions, the negative response of net exports
largely crowd out the rise in output in response to a positive government spending shock,
leading to output multipliers less than 1. Another reason could be that in the baseline
model, interest rate and inflation are included to capture the monetary policy shock,
while they are not considered in the model with short-run restrictions. The interaction
between monetary and fiscal policy is a critical role of determining the magnitude of
fiscal multipliers across countries.
Secondly, after 2008 financial crisis nominal interest rate hits the zero lower bound in
major industrialized countries as I mentioned before. The effectiveness of a fiscal expan-
sion could be affected in the zero-lower-bound regime. So the robustness of the results
is then checked by estimating the effects of fiscal policy in selected subsample periods
covering 1999q1 to 2007q4 in developed-country group. Figure 7 shows the results. After
a positive government spending shock, the real exchange rate tends to depreciate and
trade balance improves, showing a strong robustness. Private consumption decreases.
The positive impact on output is larger in the subsample than in the baseline model,
which is inconsistent with previous studies arguing that the size of the fiscal multiplier
14
can be larger when nominal interest rate are near zero.11
Thirdly, a big concern about panel data is the consistency. Estimates of the parameters
are inconsistent and structural inference is biased if heterogeneity is neglected in the
dynamics.To check the robustness, I investigate the implications in a subsample consists
of 6 countries which are members of G7. Figure 8 shows the results. Private consumption
drops only briefly on impact and then begins to rise in response to a fiscal expansion.
The real exchange rate depreciates and trade balance improves during the following two
years after the shock, which are consistent with the baseline results.
5. Conclusion
This paper has tried to empirically establish and assess the dynamic effects of an exoge-
nous increase in government spending on private consumption and the real exchange rate
in both developed and developing countries. Specifically, by fitting a panel VAR model
to time series data from a group of 14 developing countries for the period from 2000Q1
to 2015Q4 and a group of 10 developed countries for the period from 1999Q1 to 2015Q4,
this paper shows that private consumption rises in response to a fiscal expansion in both
groups and a greater consumption response in developing than developed countries. The
impact of a positive government spending shock on real exchange rate differs largely
within the two groups. After the shock, the real exchange rate appreciates in developing
countries, while a real depreciation is suggested in developed countries, which is consis-
tent with the findings of Ilzetzki et al. (2013). Trade balance moves into surplus after
the positive government spending shock in both groups, in stark contrast with findings
suggested in Monacelli and Perotti (2010) and Ravn et al. (2012). Yet Kim and Roubini
(2008) documents consistent evidence of a positive relationship between fiscal deficit and
current account surplus.
Empirical evidence in the baseline model also indicates that the positive correlation
11In recent years significant attention has been paid to the effectiveness of a fiscal expansion under the circumstance as
nominal interest rate hits zero lower bound. see Cogan et al. (2010), Christiano et al. (2005), Coenen and Straub (2005),
Davig and Leeper (2011).
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between private consumption and the real exchange rate implied by international risk-
sharing condition via complete assets market assumption does not exist in developing
countries. Although an increased consumption and a real depreciation in developed
countries suggest the positive relationship between the two, they are opposite with the
theoretical prediction of a negative consumption and a real appreciation after government
spending shocks. All of these findings call for further theoretical explorations to reveal
the mechanism that dominates the underlying transmission, given the failure of standard
models to fully explain these empirical patterns.
From a policy perspective, the results of this study could provide some important
policy implications. A expansionary fiscal policy would stimulate output and private
consumption in both developed and developing countries, but the stimulative effect on
output is larger and more persistent in developed than in developing countries while the
stimulative effect on consumption is smaller and more persistent in developed than in
developing countries. A positive government spending shock tends to depress private
investment and induce a larger drop in developed than in developing countries although
nominal interest rates increase less. The open economy effects of fiscal policy vary across
groups. In developing countries, trade balance goes into surplus as the real exchange rate
appreciates in response to a fiscal expansion, showing a strong evidence for the traditional
Mundell-Fleming channel. In developed countries, after a positive government spending
shock, the real exchange rate depreciates, which dose not induce a deterioration in trade
balance. The positive correlation between fiscal deficit and trade balance surplus sug-
gested in this paper supports the finding of “two divergence” in Kim and Roubini (2008),
which is inconsistent with a conventional argument that a fiscal deficit is associated with
a deterioration in trade balance.
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CHAPTER II
FISCAL POLICY, CONSUMPTION AND THE REAL EXCHANGE
RATE IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A
COMPARISON
1. Introduction
The theoretical analysis concerning relationships between fiscal policy, private con-
sumption, and the real exchange rate has made substantial progress since 2008 finan-
cial recession, as fiscal stimulus packages play an important role in both advanced
and emerging markets.
Despite the debates on dynamic effects of government spending on economic ac-
tivities, several recent studies based on standard vector autoregression (VAR) models
tend to find consistent evidence that private consumption rises (see Fatás and Mihov
(2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002)) and(or) real exchange rate depreciates after
the positive government spending shock in advanced economies (see Corsetti (2012);
Ravn et al. (2012); Iwata (2013); Kim and Roubini (2008); Monacelli and Perotti
(2010))12. Ilzetzki et al. (2013), yet find that in developing countries a fiscal expan-
sion causes a real exchange rate appreciation. Empirical findings documented in Li
(2017) imply that there is a discrepancy of the fiscal effects in the context of developed
and developing countries. Private consumption rises after a fiscal shock across the
two groups of countries yet it raises by a larger amount in developing than advanced
countries. The real exchange rate depreciates in developed countries while it
12One exception is Enders et al. (2011), who provide evidence of nonincrease in consumption after a fiscal expansion
using U.S. data.
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appreciates in developing countries, in response to a fiscal expansion.13
Discrepancies in the empirical evidences of advanced and developing markets call
for theoretical models that can capture different characteristics across two groups of
countries, since the differences in key features between developed and developing coun-
tries would affect government spending effects. Note that the composition of households
shows a different pattern between developed and developing countries. The World Bank’s
Global Financial Inclusion database14 document that account ownership is nearly univer-
sal in high-income countries where the fraction of adults who have an account has reached
as high as 94% in 2017. With less developed financial environment and a relatively great
share of low-income people, only about 63% of adults in developing countries have an
account, much lower than that of developed countries. This indicates that the share of
savers in high-income economies is roughly twice greater than that in developing coun-
tries.15 The existence of a great share of hand-to-mouth consumers (or, non-savers) in
developing countries may lead to upward pressure on private consumption, since hand-to-
mouth consumers, or non-Ricardian households are assumed to be liquidity constrained
and therefore cannot smooth consumption intertemporally. Unlike Ricardians’ decision
behaviors, they are less affected by the negative wealth effect after a fiscal expansion.16
Another difference between the two country groups is the degree of complementarity
between public and private consumption. Most recent studies have found that public
and private consumption are complements.17 Karras (1994) investigates the relationship
between private consumption and public spending and finds that they are more com-
plementary than substitutable. Based on the estimates in 30 countries, we can see that
overall the degree of complementarity between public and private consumption is rel-
13There are also other empirical evidence based approaches other than VAR, for example, Ramey and Shapiro (1998)
use a narrative approach to investigate U.S. data and suggest that private consumption slightly decreases after a fiscal
shock.
14URL:https://globalfindex.worldbank.org
15Empirically, there is barely direct measurement of the share of hand-to-mouth consumers, hence we resort to people
who are unbanked as a proxy.
16Galí et al. (2007) first introduce the non-Ricardian households to a simple DSGE model which produces the crowding-in
effect on consumption.
17Aschauer (1985) find substitutability between private consumpiton and overall government spending. About the
relationship between private and public consumptions, see more detailed dicussions in Karras (1994), Ni (1995), Turnovsky
and Fisher (1995) and Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004).
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atively higher in developing than developed countries. The average value of estimates
in sixteen high-income countries is -0.58 while the average value of estimates in five
developing countries is -2.6. Bouakez and Rebei (2007) argue that when a strong com-
plementarity exists between public and private consumption, higher government spending
tends to increase marginal utility of households’ consumption, stimulating households to
work more, which in turn offsets the negative wealth effect induced by an increase in
government spending. Higher complementarity in developing countries would cause a
stronger increase in marginal utility, inducing a stronger crowding-in effect of private
consumption.
Note that government financing schemes have an impact on fiscal policy effectiveness,
as well. Corsetti (2012) provides empirical evidence that a higher public debt is followed
by a drop of government spending below trend after a fiscal expansion based on a VAR
model on U.S. time series, which is then named as “spending reversals”. They state that
the effect of fiscal policy is affected not only by current tax rules and spending choices but
also by anticipation of future policy adjustments.18 However, for developing countries,
such “spending reversals”feedback is barely observed, and most developing countries have
a great reliance on tax revenue to finance their debt. Hence, in this paper, government
spending responds endogenously to the state of economy in the context of developed
countries, in addition to distortionary taxation which works as the debt stabilization
tool in both developed and developing countries.
The purpose of this paper is to build up a theoretical model to account for the dis-
crepancies in empirical evidences of the responses of private consumption and the real
exchange rate to a positive government innovation. Following Shen et al. (2018), we use a
small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, augmented
with two modifications, such as a share of hand-to-mouth consumers, direct interaction
between public and private purchase via preferences, where prices are adjusted infre-
18Baxter and King (1993), Leeper and Yang (2008) study how the changes in tax system affect the effects of fiscal policy.
Shen et al. (2018) analyze that the dependence on external financing in low-income countries contributes to the short-run
effects of government spending, as well.
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quently in a forward looking manner, to reveal the transmission mechanisms underlying
the dynamic effects of government spending shocks on private consumption and the real
exchange rate within developed and developing countries.
Several findings are shown. First, by capturing country characteristics across devel-
oped and developing countries, such as a much lower fraction of savers, a relatively higher
degree of complementarity between public and private consumption in developing than
developed countries, the baseline model successfully generates the positive response of
private consumption to a fiscal expansion in context of both developed and developing
countries and a higher level of the positive response in developing than developed coun-
tries, as well. Including the share of hand-to-mouth consumers or(and) allowing public
purchase into households’ utility function directly is helpful to explain the empirical find-
ing that the positive effect on private consumption is greater in developing than developed
countries. The negative wealth effect induced by a higher government purchase would
be offset either by a sufficient share of hand-to-mouth consumers who would spend all
of their increased income or by public consumption working as a complement to private
consumption which result in higher total private consumption and output.
Second, the baseline model generates an immediate real exchange rate appreciation
in context of developing countries which is consistent with the empirical evidence. For
developed countries, the real exchange rate tends to become depreciated gradually due
to “spending reversals”. The relatively higher degree of home bias in public spending
contributes to the immediate real appreciation within developed and developing countries.
Third, combining “spending reversals” with hand-to-mouth consumers or non-separable
preferences in context of developed countries would enhance the positive effect of gov-
ernment spending on private consumption, since “spending reversals” would mitigate the
negative wealth effect induced by the positive government spending shock. Besides, an-
ticipated spending reversals together with monetary policy tend to cause the immediate
real appreciation in response to a fiscal expansion in developed countries to depreciate
after several quarters, since the households expect public expenditure contraction in the
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future to reduce inflation and the real short-term interest rate, which, in turn, is associ-
ated with lower current long-term interest rate. Lower long-term rates then reflect a real
depreciation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is literature review. Section
3 develops the theoretical model. Section 4 describes calibrations and solutions. Section
5 discusses the model’s implications. Section 6 shows some sensitivity analysis. Section
7 concludes.
2. Literature Review
Theoretically, the effect of a fiscal expansion on private consumption can be of both signs,
which are called “crowding-in” (a rise in consumption) and “crowding-out”(a decline in
consumption) effect on consumption. The textbook IS-LM model predicts that private
consumption rises after a positive government spending shock, because increases in gov-
ernment spending trigger a rise of aggregate demand, prompting producers to increase
their production to meet this new demand, which benefits labor market and thus raises
households’ income, which in turn increases private consumption. In contrast, the Real
Business Cycle (RBC) model predicts a decline in domestic private consumption in re-
sponse to an increase of government spending, as a fiscal expansion lowers present value
of after-tax income and thus causes a negative wealth effect on consumption, assuming
consumers behave in a Ricardian fashion. Unlike private consumption, both theories pre-
dict that real effective exchange rate appreciates after a positive government spending
shock hits the economy. The IS-LM model claims that the rise in aggregate demand that
accompanies an increased government spending shock needs a nominal exchange rate
appreciation to clear the goods market, and thus entails a real exchange rate apprecia-
tion with the assumption of sticky prices. The RBC model predicts that a crowding-out
private consumption induced by a fiscal expansion would lead to a real exchange rate
appreciation with the assumption of international consumption risk sharing.
To reconcile the contradiction between empirical evidence and theoretical predictions,
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researchers have proposed different modifications to the standard model. A strand of
theoretical literature has devoted to generate nonnegative private consumption and (or)
a real exchange rate depreciation after a positive government spending shock. Some of
them has focused on the positive impact on private consumption after a fiscal expansion in
a closed economy (Galí et al., 2007; Bouakez and Rebei, 2007; Linnemann, 2006; Bilbiie,
2011, 2009). They augment some modifications such as non-Ricardian households, non-
separable preferences over consumption and leisure or productive public capital to the
standard model to generate positive consumption response. Some literature is interested
in the dynamics of the real exchange rate in response to a positive government spending
shock in an open economy, see Kim and Roubini (2008); Monacelli and Perotti (2010).
Few literature has investigated the two effects simultaneously, except for Ravn et al.
(2012), Corsetti (2012) and Iwata (2013). Ravn et al. (2012) argue that positive response
of consumption and a real depreciation can be achieved if firm markups of prices are
countercyclical with the economy. Corsetti (2012), yet resort to spending reversals to
alter the short-run impact of fiscal policy in a new Keynesian model. They argue that
after a positive government spending innovation, households expect a tight fiscal policy in
future, which, in turn lowers future inflation and policy rates, combined with the reaction
of monetary policy. This, then induces a fall in long-term real interest rates, stimulating
current consumption since consumption is negatively correlated with all future interest
rates in their theoretical model. A real exchange rate depreciation accompanies the
lower long-term real interest rates, as well. Iwata (2013) documents that a DSGE model
augmented with Edgeworth complementarity between private and public consumption,
productive public capital works well to replicate the empirical evidence of a positive
consumption response, in addition, if combined with home bias and incomplete asset
market, the real exchange rate depreciation would appear based on Japan data.
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3. The Model
This section describes the models in which transmission mechanisms underlying the ef-
fects of the government spending shocks. There are three types of agents included in
the model: households, firms and policy authorities. (1) A continuum of infinitely-lived
households optimize their utility function in which leisure and private consumption are
valued. Additionally public consumption enters utility function in some models. House-
holdes are also separated into two groups, one can save (“saver”) and the other is con-
strained to consume their income each period (“non-savers”). (2) Two production sectors
for nontradables and tradables (denoted by N and T ) seek to achieve profit optimization
by allocating capital and labor inputs. The nontraded sector is monopolistically compet-
itive and the traded sector is perfectly competitive. There are nominal price rigidities
in the nontraded sector. (3) Fiscal and monetary authorities set their instruments using
simple feedback rules. Same assumptions regarding investment adjustment costs and
labor mobility friction are made.
3.1. Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households in which a fraction F are savers
(denoted by s) and a fraction 1− F are non-savers (denoted by ns).
3.1.1. Savers

























where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, cst
∗ is composite consumption defined as in Leeper et al. (2015)
cst
∗ = cst + U
ggt, where gt is government consumption. Negative [positive] U g denotes
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complementarity[substitutability] between cst and gt. And a > 0 is a labor disutility
weight, ψ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch labor elasticity.
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t (3)
Savers can purchase domestic government bond bd,st at period t and pay a nominal rate




the inflation rate, zst is government transfers, and Ωst is profits from firms in the traded
and non-traded good sectors.
















rNt and rTt are returns to capital in non-traded and traded good sectors, respectively.
The law of motion for capital is:




t j ∈ (N, T ) (4)
where δ is the depreciation rate and ij,st is investment. Aggregate investment by savers





Private consumption and investment are CES aggregates of nontradables and tradables
with the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution χ > 0 and the degree of home bias


















, xt ∈ {cst , ist} . (5)






t = (1− ϕ)(st)−χcst (6)
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)1−χ = ϕ(pNt )
1−χ + (1− ϕ)(st)1−χ (7)





are the relative prices of traded and non-traded goods, and
St and PNt are their nominal prices, respectively. We normalize the price of composite
consumption (or local goods) to 1.



















where 0 < ϕl < 1 is the steady-state share of labor in the non-traded good sector. While
capital is specific to each sector, we allow some labor mobility across sectors, and χl > 0 is
the elasticity of substitution between sectors. Therefore, the labor mobility is not perfect.
A smaller χl implies more friction in labor mobility. From the cost minimization problem,










where wNt and wTt are the real wage rates of each sector.
3.1.2. Non-savers
Non-savers have the same preferences as savers. Non-savers are hand-to-mouth agents,
they receive after-tax labor income and lump-sum transfers znst from the government and
consume their entire disposable income every period. Non-savers have an inelastic labor
supply (lnst = lns∀t) and the budget constraint is
cnst = (1− τt)wtlns + znst . (9)
3.2. Firms and Price Setting
The production sector consists of non-traded and traded goods producing firms. Non-
traded goods firms are monopolistic competitors and prices are flexible. Nominal price
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rigidities are also introduced in the non-traded goods sector.
3.2.1. Nontraded Good Sector
The nontraded goods producer i ∈ [0, 1] has access to the technology





where zN is the sector-specific total factor productivity and kGt−1 is public capital with an















A nontraded good firm i chooses the nominal price PNt (i), labor lNt (i) and capital










t (i)− wNt lNt (i)− rNt kNt−1(i)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ΩNt (i),dividends
subject to the production function (10) and demand function (11), λt is the marginal con-
sumption utility of savers, pNt (i) =
PNt (i)
PNt
. Following Rotemberg (1982), each nontraded
goods-producing firm is assumed to have a quadratic cost when it changes the nominal
price of the variety it produces. Hence, nominal price rigidities are introduced in the









ζ ≥ 0, πNt (i) =
PNt (i)
PNt−1(i)
and πNt is the steady state level of gross inflation in nontraded
sector. Total price adjustment costs correspond to acpt ≡
∫ 1
0
acpt (i)di. Similarly, total
output nontraded and dividends are defined as yNt ≡
∫ 1
0





3.2.2. Traded Good Sector
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3.3. Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The monetary authority follows a Taylor-type rule, in which the nominal interest rate Rt
responds to current output and the current inflation rate,
Rt = R
∗ + φπ(πt − π∗) + φy(yt − y∗) (12)
where the variable with an asterisk denotes its steady state value.
The government receives taxes from capital and labor, and issues domestic bond, bdt ,
to finance its interest payments and expenditures at each period. Total expenditures
include government purchases (gCt ), public investment (gIt ), transfers to households and

















where taxt = τt(wTt lTt +rNt kNt−1+rTt kTt−1). Lump-sum transfers are assumed to be identical


































with the same intratemporal elasticity χ as in (5) and a share of public spending on non-
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traded goods 0 ≤ ϕG ≤ 1 which is assumed to be different from the home bias parameter
ϕ in the private sector.







1−χ + (1− ϕG)s1−χt
] 1
1−χ , j ∈ [GC,GI] (15)
where PGCt , PGIt are the nominal prices of gGCt and gGIt , respectively.
























and the shocks εjt are assumed to be i.i.d.-normal. The tax rate is
assumed to adjust to maintain debt sustainability, hence γτ ≥ 0. Note that if γG < 0,
government consumption and investment follow a debt-stabilizing spending rule named
“spending reversal” (Corsetti, 2012).
3.4. Aggregation and Market Clearing
Given two type of households, aggregate consumption and labor are calculated as
vt = fv
a
t + (1− f)vht , v ∈ (c, cN , cT , l, lN , lT ) (18)
Note that only savers have access to asset and capital markets, therefore investment,
capital, debt and dividends are calculated as
vt = fv
a
t , v ∈ (i, iN , iT , kN , kT , bd,Ω, aci) (19)
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Finally, the balance-of-payment condition is










t = yt (21)
4. Solution and Calibration
Sims (2001) algorithm is used to solve the log-linearized equilibrium equations of the
model which is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. To show how our framework can be
used to assess the differences in the responses of private consumption and real exchange
rate to a government spending shock in developed and developing countries, the model is
calibrated to the recent economic conditions of Canada and Mexico, respectively. We use
the quarterly data from 1998Q1 to 2017Q4 to calibrate the steady-state values of private
consumption, public investment, and government debt as a share of output, and the
income tax rate. Compared to Canada with a consumption to output ratio of roughly
55.89%, the ratio is relatively higher in Mexico, which is about 66.93%. The ratio of
public investment to output in Mexico is about 4.09% on average and this ratio is set to
3.79% for developed countries.19 The government debt-to-annual output ratio sb, is 0.299
for developed countries and 0.491 for developing countries.20 The tax rate τ , measured
by the ratio of tax revenues (including social security taxes) to GDP, is 0.13 for developed
countries and 0.143 for developing countries, and government transfers are kept constant
throughout the analysis and is calibrated to close the government budget in the steady
state.21 Tables 5 and 6 contain these calibrated steady-state values and the values of
parameter calibration.
For the following variable parameters, we use the common values in the general DSGE
literature for both developed and developing countries. One reason is that some estimates
19Due to lack of gross fixed capital formation for private sector for Canada, here we use time series data of United States.
20For developed countries, time series data of government debt to output ratio is not available in Canada so we resort
to data of Australia from 1998 to 2016, while for developing countries, data in Mexico is very short and thus we use data
in Malaysia from 2002 to 2016.
21The tax rate calibration in developing countries is based on data of Brazil, due to the lack of sufficient tax rate data
in Mexico.
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for developing countries are hard to be located due to data unavailability. Another reason
is that we need to focus on the key variable parameters in the model so as to keep all else
equal across two groups of countries. The discount factor, β, is set to equal 0.99, which
implies an annual steady state interest rate of 4%. The depreciation rate, δ, is set to 0.025,
consistent with the annual steady state depreciation rate 10% commonly used in relevant
studies.22 Quarterly CPI inflation rate is set to 1. For the intertemporal substitution
elasticity for consumption, 1/σ, we follow Ogaki et al. (1996) estimate for developing
and high-income countries. For developing countries, we are interested in upper middle-
income countries which has the point estimate of 0.605 while the estimate is 0.631 for
high-income countries. This shows that little difference of intertemporal factors in con-
sumption and saving decisions exists across developing and developed countries. Hence,
σ = 1/0.6. For the labor Frisch elasticity, the elasticity of hand-to-mouth consumers
is zero and savers’ Frisch elasticity, 1/ψ, is set to 0.5, following the value for developed
countries, since there is lack of empirical support for developing countries. Home bias in
private sector ϕ is set to be 0.5, in line with the value used in many theoretical papers.
Burstein et al. (2005) also give some empirical supports by estimating the tradable share
in the private consumer price index in five developing countries Argentina, Brazil, Korea,
Mexico and Thailand, which are 0.53, 0.593, 0.48, 0.535, and 0.433, respectively and thus
the average value is 0.514. Home bias in public sector is higher than that in private sector
due to some explicit or(and) implicit discriminatory government procurement policies.
Gourdon and Messent (2017) estimate the ratio of import share in public sector to that
in private sector and thus, home bias in government consumption is set to 0.72. Based
on the the estimate of four Latin American countries in Ostry and Reinhart (1992), the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables, χ is set to
0.44. Based on Buffie et al. (2012), labor income shares in non-traded and traded good
sectors are set to 0.45 and 0.6, respectively. Based on Gupta et al. (2014), the output
22Following García-Cicco et al. (2010), the discount factor, β, is set to 0.981 and the depreciation rate, δ, is set to 0.03,
based on quarterly time series data of Argentina. The results for developing countries, yet are quite similar to the baseline
calibration.
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elasticity with respect to public capital αG is 0.11.23 The intratemproal elasticity of sub-
stitution between non-traded good varieties is 8, matching the estimate in Pappa (2009).
As for the price adjustment cost parameter ζ, Shen et al. (2018) argues that it should be
set to match the stickiness length of price stickiness to be 4-11 months, in consistent with
the evidence showed in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). For fiscal rules, parameters ρg,
ρτ and ρz are set to be 0.9, capturing the persistence for government spending deviations
from trend stated in many related studies.
Some key variable parameters are set in the context of developed and developing
countries’ economic conditions, respectively.
For the share of savers, F , we resort to the World Bank’s Global Financial Inclu-
sion Database, which shows that 99.7% of adults have bank accounts in Canada while
the fraction is 36.9% in Mexico in 2017. We can then calculate that about 83.72% of
Canadians have bank accounts yet Mexico only has a much lower share of about 27.06%,
showing that more than two thirds Mexicans are unbanked.24
For the substitutability of private and public consumption, U g, we follow the estima-
tions in Karras (1994) showing that private and public consumption has a complementary
rather than a substitutable pattern in most of their samples. Hence, we calculate the
mean value of the estimates to calibrate the parameter. We set U g = −0.58 for developed
countries and U g = −2.6 for developing countries.25
For the sector elasticity substitution for labor, we set χl = 1 for developed countries,
in line with the estimate in Horvath (2000) using US data. There is a little direct empir-
ical support for the estimate in developing countries, yet Artuc et al. (2015) provides the
estimates of the labor mobility for 56 countries showing that in general mobility costs
in developing countries are higher than that in developed countries. On average, the
23We take the average of outupt growth and the average of public capital stock growth for middle-income countries in
1990-2000 and 2000-2009 to calculate output elasticity of public capital.
24Estimate here is consistent with the value based on calculation in Klaehn et al. (2006) and Skelton et al. (2008) that
less than 25 percent of Mexicans have bank accounts.
25According to Table 3 in Karras (1994)’s paper, we select estimates of sixteen high-income countries to get the mean
value of -0.58 and of five upper middle income countries to get the value of -2.58. We notice that the variation is wide
within each group, for example, among high-income countries, Japan has a estimate of -2.79 while United Kingdom has
an estimate of 0.05. The same pattern also shows in developing countries, where Venezuela has an estimate of -3.18 while
Thailand has an estimate of -2.18. In general, the country is less developed, public and private consumption gets more
complementary.
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labor mobility costs are 3.71 times the annual wage and 2.76 times the annual wage in
developing and developed countries, respectively. Hence, we set χl = 0.7 for develop-
ing countries, reflecting more labor mobility frictions in developing than in developed
countries.
We consider “spending reversals” in developed countries following Corsetti (2012),
hence set γG = 0.04 and a relatively less reliance on tax, hence set γτ = 0.01. For
developing countries, government is largely dependent on the taxation to stabilize debt,
hence set γτ = 0.02.
5. Results
Our baseline model is a new Keynesian model incorporated with price stickiness, non-
saving hand-to-mouth consumers, non-separable preference between public and private
consumption, and allows “spending reversal”, as well. Figure 9 shows that after a posi-
tive government spending shock, private consumption rises on impact in both developed
and developing countries, in addition, the positive response is greater in developing than
developed countries. Both savers and hand-to-mouth consumers contribute to the in-
crease in private consumption. A positive government spending shock leads to a rise
in aggregate demand, which in turn induces the production to expand and thus wage
rate goes up. And then hand-to-mouth consumers would raise their consumption with
rising wages. This is because hand-to-mouth consumers are not affected by the negative
wealth effect of future increased taxes since they have to consume all of their current
disposable income to meet living needs. Given the share of hand-to-mouth consumers
is relatively larger in developing than developed countries, the figure shows that con-
sumption of hand-to-mouth consumers goes up in all countries yet it increases more in
developing than developed countries. Based on the assumption of rational expectations,
savers tend to lower their current consumption to smooth consumption in case of the
future tax increase, given a fiscal expansion today. In the baseline model, however, con-
sumption of savers rises on impact and gradually drops below its preshock level. The
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transmission mechanism behind this is that public consumption works as a complemen-
tarity to private consumption in the model, hence, the increased public consumption
causes marginal utility of savers to increase and thus private consumption raises. The
real exchange rate appreciates immediately in both developed and developing countries,
yet it then climbs to its preshock level and becomes depreciated gradually in developed
countries. The relatively higher degree of home bias in public expenditure contributes to
the immediate real exchange rate appreciation. The figure shows that non-traded output
outperforms traded output, which is consistent with findings in Shen et al. (2018) where
under a lower degree of home bias, higher government demand causes a rise in traded
output, which, in turn, induces a real exchange rate depreciation, without external debt
financing. “Spending reversals” contributes to the improvement of the real exchange rate
in developed countries, which is consistent with Corsetti et al. (2010) who argue that
a decline in the long-term interest rate would cause the real exchange rate to become
depreciated.
In the following sections, we would examine how do hand-to-mouth consumers, pub-
lic consumption entering households’ utility function directly, and “spending reversals”
contribute to the results of baseline model, respectively.
5.1. Hand-to-mouth Consumers
We first turn to the model including hand-to-mouth consumers solely (U g = 0). Figure
10 shows that the model could successfully generate an increase of private consumption in
response to a positive government spending innovation as long as the fraction of hand-to-
mouth consumers is sufficiently large in the economy, which is consistent with Galí et al.
(2007) and Colciago (2011). After a shock, private consumption in developing countries
ascends on impact while it declines in developed countries. It is obvious that the positive
private consumption response in developing countries depends greatly on the increased
current consumption of hand-to-mouth consumers, which is large enough to offset the de-
cline in savers’ current consumption. For developed countries, although hand-to-mouth
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consumers enhance their current consumption after a fiscal expansion, yet, the majority
of the economy is savers, who tend to lower their current consumption. Therefore, the de-
cline of savers’ consumption dominates the pattern of consumption response. The model
with hand-to-mouth consumers helps to explain the greater positive response of private
consumption in developing countries than in developed countries, because compared to
developed countries, developing countries have a relatively bigger share of non-savers.
The real exchange rate appreciates after the shock in both developed and developing
countries. This is because with a larger share of hand-to-mouth consumers, private con-
sumption increases more after the shock, due to home bias in private consumption, the
increased demand for domestically produced goods raises and thus pushes up the relative
price of domestic goods to foreign goods, that is, the foreign economy is less expensive
than domestic economy, hence an appreciation occurs.
5.2. Government Spending in Utility Function
We then examine the model only augmented with government spending entering the
utility function directly (F = 1). When government spending is non-separable in house-
holds’ utility and works as a complement to private consumption, private consumption
goes up in response to a positive government spending shock. This is because increased
public purchases raise output and consumption. In figure 11 we can see that since de-
veloping countries have a relatively higher complementarity between public and private
consumption, the immediate positive response of private consumption to a government
shock in developing countries is almost as much as 5 times than that in developed coun-
tries. Non-traded and traded output ascend by a higher level, which leads to total output
raise more in developing than developed countries. Although trade output increases in
both developed and developing countries, non-traded output rises by a higher level given
a relatively higher degree of home bias in public purchase, therefore, the real exchange
rate appreciates across countries.
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5.3. “Spending Reversals”
As we mentioned before, “spending reversals” is hardly to observe in developing countries.
Hence, we examine the model with “spending reversals” in the context of developed
countries. Figure 12 shows that when we set a higher value to parameter γG, which implies
that government spending is restrained more strongly in response to higher outstanding
debt, the decline of private consumption in response to a fiscal expansion is lower and
the real exchange rate becomes depreciated in a shorter time path. The reason is that
higher inflation rate after the shock induces a rise of real interest rate, given Taylor rule.
This anticipated increase in future short-run rate is then reflected in current long-term
rate, which in turn is associated with a real exchange rate appreciation immediately.
However, after a few quarters, government spending restraint would lead inflation rate to
drop and then the process is reversed, which causes the real exchange rate to depreciate
gradually. Higher feedback effect of “spending reversals” is associated with a stronger
depreciation in a few quarters and more mitigation in negative wealth effect, implying a
smaller amount of the declined private consumption on impact.
“Spending reversals” by itself is hard to generate a positive response of private con-
sumption, nevertheless, it combines with hand-to-mouth consumers or non-separable
preference would boost the rise of private consumption in response to a fiscal shock in
the context of developed countries. Figure 13 displays that the model with hand-to-
mouth consumers alone cannot generate positive consumption response at any horizon,
since the share of hand-to-mouth consumers is much small, but combined with “spending
reversals”, private consumption tends to increase after about two years. The main con-
tribution comes from the rise of savers’ consumption, which results from the mitigation
induced by “spending reversal” on negative wealth effect. Due to the mitigation, labor and
output increase by a lower amount. Figure 14 shows that “Spending reversal” together
with non-separable preference enhance the positive response of private consumption to
a fiscal expansion, as well, but output multiplier becomes smaller given the lower rise of
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labor in response to the offset caused by anticipated spending reversal. A similar pattern
as in figure 13.
6. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we examine several other factors displaying some discrepancies between
developed and developing countries that might influence the effects of government spend-
ing. The degree of home bias in private consumption (investment) plays an important
role in determining the response of the real exchange rate. A country with more home
bias in the private sector, that is, lower trade openness, tends to experience a substantial
real exchange rate appreciation after a positive government spending shock. The reason is
that government spending mostly falls into domestic goods, which pushes up the relative
price of home-produced to foreign-produced goods, hence, domestic economy becomes
relatively more expensive than the foreign economy, which means that a real exchange
rate appreciation appears. In the baseline model, to focus on the factors of interest, we
set the same value for the degree of home bias in private sector across developed and
developing countries. Empirical evidence suggests that more home bias exists in devel-
oping than developed countries in general, due to less developed economic environment
and market conditions (Bekaert and Wang (2009)). Figure 15 displays the short-run
effects across the two groups of countries. We set ϕ = 0.72 for developing countries
and ϕ = 0.4 for developed countries, with all else equal to their settings in the baseline
model. To compare figure 15 with figure 9, we can see that for developed countries, with
lower degree of home bias, the real exchange rate tends to become depreciated on impact,
as traded output outperforms non-traded output. For developing countries, with higher
degree of home bias, non-traded goods shoot up on impact while traded goods decrease,
the relative higher price of domestic-based good leading to a substantial appreciation,
which is consistent with the statement of Ilzetzki et al. (2013) that the volatility of real
exchange rate in developed countries are more associated with the volatility in traded
goods while the volatility of real exchange rate in developing countries mainly reflects
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the fluctuations in non-traded goods.
Another factor we need to consider is the differences in fiscal rules between developed
and developing countries. Government spending is founded to be procyclical in developing
countries (e.g., Gavin and Perotti (1997), Kaminski et al. (2004), and Alesina et al.
(2008)). In the baseline model, we do not model the procyclical response in developing
countries. Now we let government spending responds to output with a one-quarter delay













+ εjt , j ∈ [GC,GI].
Following Bi et al. (2014), we set ηG = 0.1. Figure 16 shows the results. Comparing
with figure 9, little obvious changes suggest that the weakly procyclical response of
government spending to output in developing countries has less impact on the short-
run effects of government spending, or precisely, if there is, comparing to other factors
included in the baseline model, the influence is tiny.
7. Conclusion
This paper is a complement to the theoretical analysis on the effects of government
spending. The majority of existing related papers have studied fiscal policy issues in
developed countries. However, empirical evidence based on VAR model suggests that in
developed countries private consumption increases and the real exchange rate depreciates
in response to a fiscal expansion, while in developing countries, private consumption
shares a similar pattern but the crowding-in effect is stronger and the real exchange
rate appreciates in response to a fiscal expansion. This paper attempts to propose a
explanation for the discrepancies of empirical findings between developed and developing
countries.
The features in different countries such as the composition of households, comple-
mentarity between public and private consumption, government financing strategies, are
identified to influence the effects of fiscal policy. Empirical studies show that developed
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and developing countries vary greatly in terms to theses features. This paper contributes
to the literature by estimating a two-sector dynamic new Keynesian model introducing
nominal price rigidities, hand-to-mouth consumers, and non-separable preferences be-
tween public and private consumptions to study the effects of government spending on
private consumption and the real exchange rate in the context of both developed and
developing countries.
The estimated model delivers a crowding-in consumption in the two groups of coun-
tries and such positive response is larger in developing than developed countries. For the
real exchange rate, the model produces an immediate appreciation in developed and de-
veloping countries, but the real exchange rate tends to become depreciated after several
quarters in developed countries. The larger share of hand-to-mouth consumers and the
higher complementarity between public and private consumptions work well in generating
a stronger positive consumption response to a fiscal expansion in developing countries.
Although anticipated spending reversal in developed countries tends to significantly mag-
nify consumption multiplier effect on impact, it mainly works to cause the real exchange
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Impulse responses to a 1% government spending shock in developing countries. The
median responses and the 16 and 84% quantiles are depicted.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses of Developed Countries: Baseline Model































































Impulse responses to a 1% government spending shock in developed countries. The median
responses and the 16 and 84% quantiles are depicted.
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Figure 3: Cumulative Multipliers: Baseline Model













































Cumulative multipliers of developing (upper panel) and developed (lower panel) countries. Output
multiplier is the ratio of the cumulative increase in the net present value of GDP to the cumulative
increase in the net present value of government consumption. Consumption multiplier is the ratio
of the cumulative increase in the net present value of private consumption to the cumulative
increase in the net present value of government consumption. Multipliers are calculated on the
basis of impulse response functions obtained in baseline model.Dotted lines represent 90%
confidence intervals based on Monte Carlo simulation.
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses of Developing Countries: Short-run Restrictions
















































Impulse responses to a 1% government spending shock.(Short-run Restrictions_Developing
Countries)
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses of Developed countries: Short-run Restrictions
















































Impulse responses to a 1% government spending shock.(Short-run Restrictions_Developed
Countries)
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Figure 6: Cumulative Multipliers: Short-run Restrictions








































Cumulative multipliers of developing (upper panel) and developed (lower panel) countries. Output
multiplier is the ratio of the cumulative increase in the net present value of GDP to the cumulative
increase in the net present value of government consumption. Consumption multiplier is the ratio
of the cumulative increase in the net present value of private consumption to the cumulative
increase in the net present value of government consumption. Multipliers are calculated on the
basis of impulse response functions obtained in the model using short-run restriction to identify
the government spending shock. Dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals based on Monte
Carlo simulation.
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Figure 7: Impulse Responses of Developed Countries: Subsample Periods

































































Impulse responses to a 1% government spending shock. (Subsample periods:1999q1-2007q4)
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses of Developed Countries: Subsample Countries


























































Impulse responses to a 1% government spending shock. (Subsample countries: G7_exclude Japan)
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The solid lines are the responses of developed countries, and the dotted lines are the responses of
developing countries.
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The solid lines are the responses of developed countries, and the dotted lines are the responses of
developing countries.
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The solid lines are the responses of developed countries, and the dotted lines are the responses of
developing countries.
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High response has γG = 0.12; Low response has γG = 0.02.
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The solid lines are the responses of a model with hand-to-mouth consumers only (H), and the
dotted lines are the responses of a model with both hand-to-mouth consumers and “spending
reversals” (H and S).
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Figure 14: Effects of a Government Spending Shock in Developed Countries: “Spending Reversals”













































The solid lines are the responses of a model with g in utility only (G in U), and the dotted lines
are the responses of a model with both G in Utility and “spending reversals” (G in U and S).
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-3 real exchange rate
Effects of a government spending shock in developed and developing countries: upper panel is
responses of developed countries with lower degree of home bias (ϕ = 0.4); lower panel is responses
of developing countries with higher degree of home bias (ϕ = 0.72).
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Effects of a government spending shock in developing countries: procyclical response to output.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics: Standard Deviation of Nine Variables
Sample g y c nxy rer I bb r π
Australia 0.03 0.02 0.05 1.32 0.04 0.06 2.16 1.41 0.01
Canada 0.02 0.02 0.02 2.95 0.03 0.04 1.85 1.63 0.01
Denmark 0.02 0.04 0.03 1.46 0.01 0.13 2.96 1.61 0.01
France 0.05 0.02 0.02 1.54 0.01 0.05 1.68 1.59 0.00
Germany 0.02 0.02 0.01 2.13 0.01 0.05 2.10 1.59 0.00
Italy 0.03 0.02 0.02 1.46 0.01 0.04 1.70 1.59 0.01
Portugal 0.03 0.02 0.02 4.08 0.01 0.08 3.04 1.59 0.01
Spain 0.04 0.03 0.03 2.89 0.01 0.11 4.69 1.59 0.00
United Kingdom 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.56 0.02 0.06 2.79 2.18 0.01
United States 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.99 0.03 0.09 3.56 2.17 0.00
All_developed countries 0.04 0.03 0.04 4.14 0.02 0.08 3.55 1.87 0.01
Argentina 0.13 0.09 0.10 4.39 0.10 0.21 1.74 11.79 0.03
Brazil 0.03 0.04 0.04 2.15 0.07 0.10 1.17 4.47 0.01
Bulgaria 0.07 0.02 0.03 6.98 0.02 0.12 3.88 1.82 0.02
Columbia 0.03 0.03 0.03 1.88 0.05 0.07 1.55 2.66 0.01
Israel 0.03 0.03 0.03 2.07 0.03 0.07 2.78 0.01 0.01
Malaysia 0.07 0.03 0.03 5.17 0.04 0.05 2.66 0.39 0.02
Mexico 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.58 0.04 0.04 1.62 3.65 0.01
Peru 0.08 0.03 0.04 3.72 0.02 0.10 1.92 2.03 0.01
Philippine 0.05 0.03 0.03 3.01 0.03 0.05 1.75 2.22 0.01
Romania 0.10 0.02 0.04 4.25 0.03 0.16 2.78 10.88 0.01
South Africa 0.05 0.05 0.04 2.16 0.06 0.14 2.30 2.68 0.01
South Korea 0.03 0.03 0.03 2.07 0.03 0.07 2.78 0.01 0.01
Thailand 0.03 0.04 0.04 3.88 0.02 0.14 1.94 1.07 0.01
Turkey 0.05 0.06 0.05 2.93 0.07 0.15 2.21 27.16 0.02
All_developing countries 0.06 0.04 0.04 6.84 0.05 0.12 3.33 10.62 0.02
This tables shows standard deviations of each variable in each country. g:government spending,
y:output, c:private consumption, nxy:net exports to GDP ratio, rer:real exchange rate, I:private
investment, bb:budget balance to GDP ratio, r:interest rate, π:inflation rate.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Government Spending for Developed Countries
Sample GC/GDP(%) Autocorrelation Variance(GC)/Variance(GDP)
Australia 17.70 0.86 1.99
(0.37) . .
Canada 20.18 0.89 1.13
(0.93) . .
Denmark 25.38 0.80 0.21
(1.18) . .
France 23.04 0.97 7.19
(0.74) . .
Germany 18.71 0.89 1.13
(0.56) . .
Italy 19.18 0.88 1.12
(0.81) . .
Portugal 19.68 0.92 2.29
(1.00) . .
Spain 18.33 0.93 1.49
(1.52) . .
United Kingdom 19.23 0.92 1.84
(1.53) . .
United States 15.29 0.94 2.21
(0.86) . .
All_developed countries 19.67 0.88 2.26
(2.80) (0.07) (1.91)
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Government Spending for Developing Countries
Sample GC/GDP(%) Autocorrelation Variance(GC)/Variance(GDP)
Argentina 13.94 0.94 2.11
(2.36) . .
Brazil 19.05 0.88 0.83
(0.45) . .
Bulgaria 18.23 0.42 10.91
(1.96) . .
Columbia 16.60 0.81 1.00
(0.89) . .
Israel 23.76 0.50 0.77
(1.43) . .
Malaysia 9.93 0.12 8.30
(1.08) . .
Mexico 7.46 0.36 6.18
(0.38) . .
Peru 8.02 0.80 6.99
(0.66) . .
Philippine 10.11 0.55 3.08
(0.86) . .
Romania 17.06 0.23 16.75
(1.96) . .
South Africa 19.38 0.88 1.19
(0.97) . .
South Korea 15.51 0.50 0.77
(1.59) . .
Thailand 14.79 0.30 0.49
(1.56) . .
Turkey 13.50 0.46 0.81
(1.07) . .
All_developing countries 14.81 0.55 4.30
(4.71) (0.27) (4.93)
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Table 5: Parameter Calibration: Common Values Shared in Two Countries Groups
parameters values
β the discount factor 0.99
π quarterly CPI inflation 1
σ savers’ inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity for consumption 1/0.6
ψ savers’ inverse of the Frisch labor elasticity 2
θ substitution elasticity among nontraded goods 8
δ capital depreciation rate for private capital 0.025
χ substitution elasticity b/w tradables and nontradables 0.44
χl substitution elasticity b/w two types of labor 0.7
ϕ the degree of home bias in goods 0.5
ϕG home bias in g 0.72
αG output elasticity to public capital 0.11
αN labor income share of the non-traded sector 0.47
αT labor income share of the traded sectors 0.6
κ investment adjustment cost (non-tradable and tradable sectors) 6
zN TFP in non-traded good sector, normalization 1
ρg AR(1) coefficient in gt 0.9
ρτ AR(1) coefficient in τt 0.9
ρz AR(1) coefficient in z 0.9
ρzT AR(1) coefficient in z
T 0.9
φπ interest rate response to inflation 1.5
gI/y public investment to output ratio 0.04
Table 6: Parameter Calibration: Developed vs. Developing Countries
parameters developed developing
F fraction of savers 0.84 0.27
Ug complementarity of private and public consumption -0.58 -2.6
sb government debt-to-output ratio 0.29 0.49
c/y private consumption-to-output ratio 0.56 0.66
τ income tax rate 0.143 0.13
γτ tax response to public debt-to-output ratio 0.01 0.02
γG g response to public debt-to-output ratio 0.04 0
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APPENDIX C: The Data
This appendix presents the data collection in the first chapter. To be included in
the data set a country must have at least 15 years (or 60 quarters) of consecutive
quarterly observations for GDP, private consumption, private investment, net exports,
government spending, government budget balance, nominal interest rate and the real
effective exchange rate.
Data coverage: 14 developing countries including Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Columbia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippine, Romania, South Africa, South
Korea, Thailand, Turkey. 10 developed countries including Australia, Canada, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, United States.
For all countries, GDP deflator, Net export-to-GDP ratio, real government spend-





Net export-to-GDP ratio =
Nominal Exports− Nominal Imports
Nominal GDP
× 100
Real government spending =
Nominal government spending
GDP deflator







The big challenge of this quarterly-frequency study of fiscal policy in a large number
of counties was collecting the key fiscal data: government expenditure and govern-
ment budget balance. Since most counties have reported them in an annual frequency,
especially for the government budget balance data. Tables 7, 8 and 9 summarize the
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sources, time span, and definitions of the two main fiscal data. More details of gov-
ernment expenditure see Ilzetzki et al. (2013). Quarterly data on government budget
balance for some countries is summed up from the monthly frequency. All Data are
seasonally adjusted. Other variables are as follows.
Gross Domestic Product
Real and nominal GDP from OECD Quarterly National Accounts section were
used for all developed countries and several developing countries (including Brazil,
Mexico). Elsewhere, GDP data are taken from the same data source as the govern-
ment expenditure data for other developing countries.
Private Consumption
Same data source as GDP.
Private Investment
Same data source as GDP. Gross fixed capital formation serial.
Net Export
Same data source as GDP. Goods and services of exports serial and goods and
services of imports serial.
Nominal Interest Rate
Interbank 3-month rates from OECD Monthly Economic Indicators section was
used for developed countries and several developing countries (including Brazil, Mex-
ico). Other nominal interest rates are as follows: Interbank rate from central bank of
Argentina (BCRA) is used for Argentina. The basic interest rate (BIR) from National
Bank is used for Bulgarian. Policy rates from bank of Israel is used for Israel. Inter-
bank lending rate from Central Bank is used for Malaysia. Interbank rate from Banco
de Mexico is used for Mexico. Saving rate from central reserve bank is used for Peru.
Policy rates (Repo) from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas is used for Philippines. Policy
rates from national bank is used for Romania. Policy rate (Repo) from reserve bank
is used for South Africa. Policy rates from bank of Thailand is used for Thailand.
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Overnight borrowing rate from central bank is used for Turkey. Policy rates from the
bank of Korea is used for Korea. Policy rates (intervention rate) from Banco de la
Republica is used for Colombia.
Real Effective Exchange Rate
A CPI-based real exchange rate was used. Real effective exchange rates from
OECD Monthly Economic Indicators section was used for developed countries. For
developing counties, where ever available, the narrow real exchange rate index of the
Bank for International Settlements was used. Otherwise, the broad index was used.
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Table 7: Government Consumption
Country Start End Source
Argentina 1993q1 2017q1 MECON
Brazil 1996q1 2017q1 OECD
Bulgaria 2000q1 2017q1 Bulgarian National Bank
Colombia 2000q1 2017q2 DANE
Israel 1995q1 2017q2 Central Bureau of Statistics
Malaysia 1998q1 2017q2 Department of Statistics
Mexico 1993q1 2016q4 OECD
Peru 1980q1 2017q1 Central Reserve Bank of Peru
Philippine 1998q1 2017q2 Philippine Statistics Authority
Romania 1995q1 2017q1 NIS - National Institute of Statistics
South Africa 1960q1 2017q1 Statistics South Africa
South Korea 1999q1 2017q1 Statistics South Africa
Thailand 1993q1 2017q2 NESDB
Turkey 1998q1 2017q1 Turkish Statistical Institute
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Table 8: Government Budget Balance for Developing Countries
Country Start End Source Series and Comments
Argentina Jan1993 Jul2017 MECON Public sector, pri-
mary balance.
Brazil Jan1997 Jul2017 Ministerio tda Fazenda Central govern-
ment, primary
balance. NSA
Bulgaria 1998q1 2017q1 Ministry of Finance General budget bal-
ance
Colombia Jan1963 Jul2017 Banco de la Republica Central government
surplus/deficit
Israel 2000q1 2017q2 Bank of Israel Federal government
budget, excluding
credit.
Malaysia 1981q1 2017q2 Central Bank Federal govern-
ment budget
surplus/deficit
Mexico Jan1990 Jul2017 Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) Federal govern-
ment, primary
surplus/deficit
Peru 1990q1 2017q1 Central Reserve Bank Central govern-
ment, primary
surplus/deficit
Romania Jan1992 Sep2017 Ministry of Public Finance Deficit or Surplus,
GFS2001. NSA
Philippine Jan1959 Jul2017 Bureau of the Treasury Central gov-
ernment overall
surplus/deficit
South Africa Jan1960 Jul2017 Reserve Bank Central govern-
ment, budget
surplus/deficit
South Korea Dec1999 Jun2017 The Bank of Korea Central government
balance. NSA
Thailand Jan1991 Jul2017 Bank of Thailand National gov-
ernment cash
surplus/deficit




Table 9: Government Budget Balance for Developed Countries
Country Start End Source Series and Comments
Australia Aug1973 Jul2017 DOFA General govern-
ment budget,
operating result.





Denmark 1999q1 2017q2 Statistics Denmark General govern-
ment budget



























U.K. Jan1993 Aug2017 ONS Central government
saving, gross.
U.S. 1950q1 2017q2 BEA Net Federal Gov-
ernment Saving
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APPENDIX D: Solving the Quantitative Model
This appendix presents the equilibrium conditions, the steady state for the baseline
model in the second chapter.
Optimality Conditions













Savers’ FOC for lat :
a(lat )
ψ = λt(1− τt)wt (3)


















































Savers’ FOC for iNt :







Savers’ FOC for iTt :
















Labor supplied to the traded good sector:
























































Total demand for nontraded good:
DNt = ϕ
(






















Demand for kN and lN :
(1− αN)wNt lNt = αNrNt kNt−1 (17)
Demand for kT :
rTt k
T
t−1 = (1− αT )sTt yTt (18)
































Law of motion for kN :
kNt = (1− δ)kNt−1 + iNt (22)
Law of motion for kT :
kTt = (1− δ)kTt−1 + iTt (23)







































t = yt (27)
ch:


































































































∗ + φπ(πt − π∗) + φy(yt − y∗) (41)



























tdt = ct + gt + it − yt (45)
Dummy variable for πNt−1:
d
πNt
t ≡ πNt−1 (46)
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Steady State
There are 46 variables: λa, la, lh, ca, ch, pn, s, pGC , pGI , w, wN , wT , π, πN , dπN , yN , kN , iN ,
qN , rN , lN , yT , kT , iT , qT , rT , lT , zT , g, gC , gI , kG, τ, tax, z, bd, R, eff, c, i,DN , l.y, td, sg, sb.
3 shocks: ugC , ugI , uzT
Assume pn = s = pGC = pGI = 1, π = πN = π∗ = infl
From equation (2), we get R = π/β.
From equation (4), (5), (6), (7), (22), (23), we get:
rN = rT = (
1
β
+ δ − 1) ∗ (1− τ)−1 (47)



























































can be calculated from i
y






would be calculated according to equation (49) and (50). For an initial guess of yN
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and ch, the following steady-state variables can be calculated: y, yT , c, ca, ch, cN , cT ,
i, iN , iT , k, kN , kT , gN(= yN − cN − iN), g, gT , gC , gI , kG, λ, bd
Assume the steady-state share of labor in the nontraded good sector, ϕl, equals




Next, assume la = lh, and then l = fla + (1− f)lh = la, so equations (3) becomes
a(lt)
ψ = λt(1− τt)wt (51)
And then lN , lT , l, wN , wT , and w, can be simultaneously solved from equation











As for fiscal variables, given τ , gC , gI , bd, R, π, transfer is
z = τ
(







bd − pGCgC − pGIgI (53)
Another way to solve labor and wage variables. Assume l = 1, then, ln = ϕl,
lt = 1− ϕl, w = wN = wT = θ−1
θ
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